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Terminology 
 
Android system  The Android Operating system is an open source OS de-
signed mainly to mobile devices. Android is written in Java 
and it is based on Linux. Google purchased it from Android 
Inc. in 2005. (Android OS, N.d.) 
Android Debugging Bridge Android Debug Bridge, abbreviated as ADB, is a client side 
command line tool for debugging and development pur-
poses. It allows communicating with an emulator or with a 
connected Android device. (Android Debug Bridge, N.d.) 
API  Acronym from words Application Programming Interface. 
API is a program that manages interaction with other pro-
grams. API allows a developer to communicate the under-
lying application with callable functions. (Application Pro-
gramming Interface (API). N.d.) 
Attacker  Synonym for hacker and adversary. Person or organization 
who exploits weaknesses in the application in order to 
achieve control over the system for personal gain. 
(Hacker. N.d.) 
Attack  Synonym for Cyber-attack. Exploitation of computer sys-
tems, mobile applications and networks. Attacks are often 
executed by injecting malicious code to alter program 
logic to leak data or gain control over the computer sys-
tem. (Cyberattack. N.d.) 
Authentication  The process that confirms and ensures user’s identity to 
the system. (Authentication, N.d.) 
Authorization  The process that allows or denies user’s access to the sys-
tem, server or web API. (Authorization, N.d.) 
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Certificate  a Digital Certificates are used to confirm identity of a 
sender of an encrypted message to a client who then 
knows that the message came from a trusted source. (Dig-
ital Certificate, N.d.) 
Certificate Authority  A certificate authority, abbreviated as CA, is a trusted en-
tity that issues Digital Certificates that verifies the certifi-
cate holders identity. (Certificate Authority, N.d.) 
Client  Refers to a person or organization who ordered the devel-
oped application or service. 
Credentials  Credentials are proof of identity that is used to authorize 
access to the system and to authenticate the user. For ex-
ample, credentials could be username and password or 
fingerprint of the user. (Credentials, N.d.) 
Denial-Of-Service  A Denial-Of-Service attack, abbreviated as DoS, is a type of 
an attack where attacker attempts to prevent users from 
accessing the service. (Denial-of-Service Attack, N.d.) 
Developer  A developer is an individual, who designs, builds and cre-
ates the application. (Developer, N.d.) 
Device  A Mobile device is a handheld device designed to be port-
able, lightweight and small in size. (Mobile Device, N.d.)
Emulator  A Software that is used to emulate/simulate a mobile de-
vice. It is meant for developers to test their applications 
without fuzz of transferring them and installing them in to 
a physical device. (Mobile Emulator, N.d.) 
Encryption  The process of converting data into an unreadable form 
and making it impossible to read for unauthorized users. 
(Encryption, N.d.) 
HTTP / HTTPS  Hypertext Transfer Protocol, abbreviated as HTTP, is a pro-
tocol used to communicate in World Wide Web. Its secure 
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version is known as Hypertext Transport Protocol Secure, 
HTTPS. (Hypertext Transport Protocol Secure, N.d.; Hyper-
text Transport Protocol, N.d.) 
Man-In-The-Middle  A Man-In-The-Middle attack, abbreviated as MITM, is an 
attack where attacker gets between communications of 
two parties.  Attacker could then be eavesdropping com-
munication or modify data that is being sent through. 
(Man-in-the-Middle Attack, N.d.) 
Malicious application  A Mobile Malware is malicious software designed specifi-
cally to mobile devices, such as tables and smartphones. 
Malicious application can exploit security flaws in the op-
erating system or in other application installed in to the 
contaminated device. (Mobile Malware, N.d.) 
Obfuscation  The process of obscuring the program code to prevent re-
verse engineering and copying the source code illegally. 
(Obfuscation, N.d.) 
Phishing  Phishing attack is an act of trying to get user password or 
user’s other sensitive information by masquerading as 
trusted website or application, or by sending lure emails. 
(Phishing, N.d.) 
Root  Root, also known as Superuser, is the administrator and 
the most privileged account in the Android system. Root 
account can only be accessed by rooting the device. 
(Superuser, N.d.) 
Signing  Code Signing is a technology of verifying the authenticity 
of an application publisher in order to avoid installing mal-
ware masqueraded as the legitimate application. (Code 
Signing, N.d.) 
TLS  Transport Layer Security, abbreviated TLS, is a crypto-
graphic protocol used to provide secure communication 
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between applications over the internet. TLS is the succes-
sor of Secure Socket Layer, SSL protocol. (Transport Layer 
Security, N.d.) 
Token  Access Token is an object that is used to encapsulate the 
user’s security credentials and other user information to 
authorize the use of the system, server or application. Ac-
cess token cannot be used to authenticate user, it is done 
with the usage of Authentication Token, which encapsu-
lates user information to authenticate the user in the sys-
tem, server or application. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Security of mobile applications 
According to NowSecure’s mobile security report (2016 NowSecure mobilesecurity 
report, 2016),  
 The number of mobile devices on Earth has surpassed the number of people living 
on it 
 Forrester predicted people would download more than 226 billion apps in 2015 
 24.7 percent of mobile apps include at least one high risk security flaw 
 The average device connects to 160 unique IP addresses every day 
 35 percent of communications sent by mobile devices are unencrypted 
 Business apps are three times more likely to leak login credentials than the average 
app 
 8 out of every 10 phones in the world use the Android operating system  
 Android currently has an estimated 1.6 million apps available on Google Play 
 Only 43.8 percent of Android users have adopted Android Lollipop according to 
NowSecure mobile security intelligence 
 
As it can be seen from the numbers above, the security of mobile applications is not 
very good even when the number of released mobile applications is growing fast. 
Mobile applications can nowadays do many tasks compared to the times of Nokia 
3310 and its Snake game. Mobile phones can do so much more than just make calls 
and send SMS messages: both personal and work email can be synced to the device, 
and there are several instant messaging applications to keep in touch with friends; 
some of those applications are able to offer voice and video calls over the internet. 
Mobile devices can be now used to shop online and pay bills as well as do bank trans-
fers.  Some applications and devices even allow users to pay contactless payments in 
shops or allow phones to be used as keys. 
If the application security is not good enough, an adversary could exploit the applica-
tion’s weaknesses to achieve control over those matters: to read user’s private, and 
work messages and emails, eavesdrop their internet behavior, phish credit card in-
formation or user credentials to various websites and services, or even worse, to 
steal money directly from user’s bank account. 
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1.2 Digia Finland Oy 
Digi Finland Oy is the customer organization for this work. Digia Finland Oy is the 
Finnish branch of multinational Digia Oy operating in several countries, including 
Sweden, Norway, Germany, Russia, China, South Korea and the United States. Digia 
has several domains working in very different areas, including commercial, logistics, 
and industrial sectors, the public sector, banking and insurance. This thesis was as-
signed by Digia Financial Solutions operating in the banking and insurance fields. 
Digia Financial solutions has focused on offering wide area of solutions for financial 
sector; including banks, asset managers, mutual fund companies and other 
investment management companies and institutions. Normally these solutions are 
systems of grand scale used to run core processes of the client company.  
As mobile devices and applications are evolving, so are their possible usages. In the 
future, some of these offered solutions might contain mobile applications that could 
be used to automate simple processes. Because of the nature of the financial sector, 
these applications and devices must then be very secure and reliable. 
1.3 Assignment and objectives 
Because cyber security plays an important role in the financial sector’s solutions, the 
assignment was to study the possible weaknesses in application development. As 
there are several mobile platforms, such as IOS and Windows phone, the focus was 
decided to be placed on the most popular operating system, Android OS. 
Applications fall into three main types,  
1. Native applications launched from an icon in the start menu. 
2. Web applications that are just websites and accessed through the internet browser in 
the device. 
3. Hybrid applications which are like Native applications, however, do contain web ele-
ments through WebView component. 
 
In this work the focus is on Native applications, leaving Webview out of the scope of 
the thesis. 
The idea was to keep the view in application development for an enterprise, making 
security standards higher than in small games or utility applications, like torchlight 
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application or Tic-Tac-Toe game. Additionally, the idea was to solve mobile specific 
issues rather than universal problems in application development. For example, in a 
web application it is normal to type username and password to the application to 
start a new session, however, in the mobile environment this would be a nuisance. 
  
11 
 
 
2 Application Security  
2.1 Creating secure connection to the server 
According to OWASP Mobile top 10 vulnerabilities (2015), insecure Transport Layer 
Protection (TLS) transmission is the third most common vulnerability in mobile 
applications; the attacker might exploit vulnerabilities to intercept sensitive data 
while it is traveling across the wire, which might expose an individual user's data and 
can lead to an account theft. If the attacker intercepts an administrative account, the 
entire site could be exposed. Poor SSL setup can also facilitate phishing and man-in-
the-middle attacks. (Mobile top 10 vulnerabilities, 2015) 
2.1.1 TLS protocols and ciphers 
There are several versions of SSL and TLS protocols, however, only two versions 
should be used, TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2. The other versions, SSL 2.0, 3.0 and TLS 1.0 suf-
fer from several vulnerabilities, such as Poodle, Crime, Beast and CBC; so those ver-
sions are no longer safe to use. (Green, 2015; PCI Security Standards Council, 2015) 
Unsafe protocols can be disabled from connection negotiations by creating a custom 
SSL Socket Factory class in the application. Note that TLS 1.1 and 1.2 are not in An-
droid API versions prior 16, Android 4.1, Jelly Bean. (SSLSocket, N.d.) 
Unsafe or weak ciphers should be removed from the application to ensure safety of 
encrypted data. Even in Android 5.0 there are some unsafe ciphers enabled by de-
fault, like TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, which uses outdated MD5 cryptography. 
(User agent capabilities: Android 5.0.0, N.d) 
It would be most optimal from the security perspective to use ciphers that use For-
ward Secrecy. In most common key exchange mechanisms, RSA session keys are cre-
ated from server’s private key. Should a server’s private key fall into hands of an at-
tacker, it could decrypt not only all future communication but also all encrypted data 
the attacker has gathered before obtaining the server’s private key. 
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Instead of RSA-based key exchange, there is ephemeral Diffie-Hellman algorithm, 
which is slower and generates session keys in such a way that only the two parties in-
volved in the communication can obtain them; even with the access to server’s pri-
vate key. After the session is complete, and both parties destroy the session keys, the 
only way to decrypt the communication is to break the session keys themselves. This 
protocol feature is known as forward secrecy. (Ristic, 2013) 
Breaking session keys is clearly much more difficult than obtaining the server’s pri-
vate key. Now the attackers can no longer obtain just one key to decrypt communica-
tions but they have to compromise the session keys belonging to every individual 
conversation. (Ristic, 2013) 
SSL supports forward secrecy using two algorithms, the Diffie-Hellman, from now on 
DHE, and the adapted version for use with Elliptic Curve cryptography, from now on 
ECDHE; however, there are two problems in using them. DHE is significantly slower 
than common RSA-based algorithms. ECDHE is slightly faster than DHE, yet still much 
slower than RSA. Also, both cipher types are quite new and the older Android ver-
sions will not support them. DHE is supported on Android 2.3 Gingerbread, API level 
9+ and ECDHEs are supported on, Android 4.4.4 Kitkat, API level 20+. (SSLSocket, 
N.d.; Ristic, 2013; Bernat, 2011) 
Disabling and enabling used ciphers requires the creation of custom SSLSocketFac-
tory. 
Note that some libraries, e.g. third-party analytics companies and social network 
addons might use their SSL versions to establish connections when the application 
runs, causing mixed SSL sessions and thus might expose the user’s session ID. 
(Transport Layer Protection Cheat Sheet, N.d.) 
2.1.2 Certificates 
SSL Certificates are used in TLS protocol to encrypt transferred data, provide authen-
tication of the server to the client and to ensure data integrity. Anyone can create 
own key pair, and then have it signed by a Certificate Authority, often shortened as 
CA. 
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Certificate Authorities are trusted entities that issue certificates. A person who wants 
their server to be trusted by the Android system needs to have their public key 
signed by a CA. Even if self-signed certificates would be just as good to encrypt the 
data, the end-user device would not know if the server’s certificate would indeed be 
the real one or not, thus causing vulnerability to a man-in-the-middle attack. 
From SSLShopper site, article “Why SSL? The Purpose of using SSL Certificates” (N.d.):  
The biggest problem with a self-signed certificate is a man-in-the-mid-
dle attack. Even if you are 100% sure that you are on the correct website 
and you completely trust the site, you could have someone intercept the 
connection and present you with their own self-signed certificate. You 
would think that you are using a secure connection with your server but 
you are really using a secure connection to an attacker's server. 
Android system has a build-in list of trusted CAs’ root certificates. If, for some reason 
developer would not want to use a trusted CA to sign their key, they could create 
their own CA and import its root certificate to the device. Of course, this would be a 
huge effort if the application is deployed to several users, however, this can be 
avoided if Public Key Pinning is used, see chapter 2.1.3 for more details about public 
key pinning. (When are self-signed certificates acceptable?, N.d.) 
Sometimes an Android system might not recognize a certificate returned from the 
server, which might be due to the certificate being self-signed, or the server is not 
returning the whole certificate chain, thus the Android system misses the 
intermediate CA returned from the server. (Security Tips, N.d.) 
According to official Android developer site (Security with HTTPS and SSL, N.d.), most 
public CAs do not sign server certificates directly. Instead, they use their main CA 
certificate, referred to as the root CA, to sign intermediate CAs. They do this so the 
root CA can be stored offline to reduce the risk of compromise. However, operating 
systems like Android typically trust only root CAs directly, which leaves a short gap of 
trust between the server certificate—signed by the intermediate CA—and the 
certificate verifier knowing the root CA. To solve this, the server does not send the 
client only its certificate during the SSL handshake but a chain of certificates from the 
server CA through any intermediates necessary to reach a trusted root CA. 
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If the server does not provide a full certificate chain to the application, it should not 
be trusted. 
2.1.3 Public key pinning 
Because trusted CAs has been targets of security breaches and they have issued cer-
tificates for unqualified names, such as “localhost” and “webmail”, their trustworthi-
ness has been compromised. In security breaches attackers managed to issue fraudu-
lent certificates to several sites, like Windows Update server and Gmail. These forged 
and misleading certificates could be used to spread malware and eavesdrop users. 
This kind of nationwide man-in-the-middle attack against Google Gmail users was un-
covered in Iran after Google started using public key pinning in Google Chrome web 
browser. (Schoen, and Galperin, 2011; Elenkov, 2012) 
Normally in SSL connection, the client only checks that the server’s certificate has a 
verifiable chain of certificates and it matches the hostname, however, it does not 
check if the certificate is indeed the one that the developer installed into the server. 
In application development the developer most likely knows the host and therefore 
can make sure that the certificate that the server returns is the original one. (Certifi-
cate and Public Key Pinning, N.d.) 
The application can withhold public key hashes of the expected certificate and then 
parse the public key from the certificate and compare the hashes; if they are equal 
the connection can continue, otherwise it should be dropped. Pinned certificate’s 
public key could be from the server’s certificate, or if their own CA is used, it could be 
its public key. (Pinning Cheat Sheet, N.d.) 
Pinned certificates should be saved in a secure location to avoid attackers from ex-
tracting them from the device in case of losing the device or reverse engineering the 
application’s installation package. 
2.1.4 Client-side certificates 
Client side certificates can be used with TLS to prove the identity of the client to the 
server. This method requires the client to provide their certificate to the server, in 
addition to the server providing theirs to the client.  
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Even when client certificates bring an additional layer of security, this has several 
problems, such as certificate generation, safe distribution of the certificate, client 
side configuration, certificate revocation and reissuance, and clients can only 
authenticate to servers with the client’s certificate installed. Due to the sheer 
complexity of this implementation, the client side certificates should only be used in 
high-security applications with small volume of users. (Transport Layer Protection 
Cheat Sheet, N.d.) 
For instance, if client-side certificate is preinstalled in the application’s keystore and 
it has predefined password access, an attacker could reverse engineer the keystore’s 
password and so obtain the client-side ceritificate. For each client to have a different 
certificate, physical installation of the certificate would probably be needed to be 
sure that it is not compromised during the transmission to the device. 
2.2 Authentication and authorization to the backend 
2.2.1 OAuth 2.0 with OpenID Connect 
In a normal web application, users are requested their credentials every time they 
access the service. This works just fine in applications that are not used often or are 
used only in a single session, however, in mobile environment it is very inconvenient 
to the users to submit credentials every time they want to access the service. (Bray, 
2013) 
In HTTP Basic Authentication, API key must be presented in every call, and Google 
recommends (Security Tips. N.d.), that user password should not be saved in the de-
vice and API key should not been directly implemented into application. (See Chapter 
2.2 Obfuscation) OAuth 2.0 protocol does not require saving API keys into an unsafe 
environment. Instead, it will generate access tokens that can be stored in an un-
trusted environment temporarily.  (Degges, 2015; Godfrey, David, Raghav & Onur, 
2014, 181) 
Simplified OAuth workflow is explained below. For more detailed information, see 
Appendix 1. 
1. User opens the app. 
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a. App checks if token exists and it is valid. 
2. App asks credentials from the user. 
a. App needs to ask the user for their username and password to retrieve first 
token.  
3. App sends requests to the API service. 
4. API Server authenticates the user. 
a. Service validates retrieved username and password. 
5. API server generates a token and returns it to the app. 
6. App saves the token to a secure place, like in Shared Preferences or in Account man-
ager. 
7. App Makes Authenticated Requests to API server using retrieved token. 
 
As OAuth is just an authorization protocol, it needs some additional elements to ac-
tually authenticate the user. According to OAuth site itself (User Authentication with 
OAuth 2.0. N.d.), user should never authenticate using only OAuth protocol, as it is 
not sufficient. For instance, Facebook used to use wrongly implemented plain OAuth 
to authenticate its users and it was found to be vulnerable to “Covert Redirect”-at-
tack. (Goldshlager, 2013) 
To authenticate the user securely when using OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect must be 
implemented on top of that. OpenID Connect is an authentication layer that operates 
on top of OAuth 2.0. Too see how OpenID Connect changes the workflow of OAuth 
2.0, see Figure 1. (User Authentication with OAuth 2.0. N.d.; Welcome to OpenID Con-
nect. N.d.; Sakimura, NRI, Bradley, Ping Identity, Jones, Microsoft, de Medeiros, 
Google, Mortimore, & Salesforce. 2014.) 
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Figure 1. Workflow of OAuth 2.0 with OpenID Connect where Google acts as OpenID 
Provider (adapted from Matake, 2014, 31) 
 
Benefits of using OAuth 2.0 with OpenID connect are but are not limited to the fact 
that user’s password is not saved to the device, and thus it cannot be extracted from 
there; changing the user’s password would not deprecate all the user’s saved creden-
tials in every application that user has given their credentials, and user does not need 
to submit their username and password every time they need to access the applica-
tion, making phishing attacks a lot harder. (Security Tips. N.d.) 
2.2.2 Using Google Sign-in 
Google Sign-In is a secure authentication system that uses Google accounts, the very 
same account that user already uses to access Google services, like Google play, to 
securely authenticate with application’s back-end server. Google Sign-in can be inte-
grated with the application and its backend to quickly authenticate users, to easily 
manage accounts and to integrate Google services, e.g. access user’s calendar and 
contacts. (Google Identity Platform. N.d.) 
Google sign-in is based on OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect; (See chapter 2.2.1 OAuth 
2.0 with OpenID Connect) where Google’s servers acts as authorization endpoints. 
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When user taps the sign-in button in the application, user is prompted to choose an 
account to use with the application and give application permission to use it for au-
thentication purposes; then the application only needs to send the ID token through 
HTTPS to the server, where the server then validates and verifies the token using 
Google API Client Libraries. See Figure 2 for more detailed view in this workflow. 
(Moroney, 2016; Authenticate with a backend server. N.d.) 
 
Figure 2. Google Sign-In Workflow (adapted from Moroney, L. 2016) 
As seen above, Google Sign-in is a very simple and effortless way to implement au-
thentication to the server and application, however, it requires user to have a Google 
account and developer to trust Google’s services. 
2.2.3 Using Smart lock for passwords 
Google offers to users the possibility to save their login credentials to other sites and 
applications in their Google accounts, the idea being that Google account would act 
as a password vault for user’s passwords. Developers can use this feature to auto-
matically login users in to their applications and websites to achieve an effortless and 
fast login experience for users. See Figure 3 to details of Smart Lock login experience. 
(Smart Lock for passwords on Android. N.d.) 
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Figure 3. Smart lock for passwords on Android workflow. (Adapted from Smart Lock 
for passwords on Android. N.d.) 
 
Users can manage the saved credentials in their Google account site and see their 
saved passwords from there, which causes a security issue should the user lose their 
account to an attacker that would allow the attacker to steal, not only user’s Google 
account, but also all accounts linked to it. (Wallen, 2016.) 
Google does provide its users with multiple security features to protect their ac-
counts, like two factor authentication but it is up to the user to get them in use. 
Google’s smart lock for passwords is an excellent solution to small scale applications 
where fast access is required and no financial loss could happen. (Wallen, 2016.) 
2.2.4 Using Identity Toolkit 
Google identity toolkit works in a similar way than Google Sign-In; (See chapter 2.2.2) 
it also uses OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect: it allows developer to choose a set of 
identity providers to authenticate the user, and to users a login with email, in case if 
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user does not have account in any offered identity provider, or does not trust them. 
(Google Identity Platform, N.d.; Account Chooser. N.d.; Sign-in flow. N.d.) 
 
 
Figure 4. Identity toolkit workflow. (Adapted from Sign-in flow. N.d.) 
 
As seen in the figure above (Figure 4), the account chooser workflow is very user 
friendly and supports several handy features from the developer’s perspective, such 
as account migration, in case user logins in with another identity provider after the 
first login. (Google Identity Platform. N.d) 
Usage of the Google identity toolkit has the same benefits as using Google sign-in 
and plain OAuth, 2.0 but has also to offer different identity providers than Google 
and developer’s own. Using the identity toolkit is probably the most suitable of wide-
spread applications in public that does not require bank like security, due to its easy 
implementation and fast sign-in/sign-up flow in user’s perspective. 
2.2.5 Using custom authenticator 
Most OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect solutions require using external authentication- 
and authorization-endpoints. If the developed application was a high security 
application it would be undesirable to trust external companies and services to 
authenticate users. For example, who would like to use mobile banking application 
with Facebook login? (Cohen, 2013.)  
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If developer decides to create their own implementation of authenticator class in the 
application, then developer needs to make sure to implement all functionalities to 
offer same kind of seamless login and token verification as other offered solutions 
do, like in Google’s Identity toolkit. (Cohen, 2013.)  
2.3 Secure data storage  
2.3.1 Shared preferences 
Shared preferences are application specific XML files in the application’s data direc-
tory and they consist of a list of name-value pairs. Shared preferences can be used to 
save small amounts of primitive data, Booleans, floats, integers, longs, and strings. 
Data in the file will persist across user sessions; even when the application is killed or 
the device is rebooted. Typically user preferences and high scores from games are 
saved in the Shared preferences and sometimes even user credentials. (Storage Op-
tions, N.d; Insecure Local Storage: Shared Preferences, N.d.) 
Shared preferences are protected with UID permissions, i.e. applications with the 
same UID are only able to access those XML files. Malicious applications can only ac-
cess those files it they are granted root level permissions on a rooted device. (Six, P. 
2012, 21-22) 
As Shared preferences are just XML files in the Android file system, an attacker can 
access those files upon physical access to the device. The file could be extracted from 
the device using Android Debugging Bridge, from now on ADB, using its backup func-
tionality. Or if the device is rooted, files can be retrieved by just transferring them us-
ing the ADB. (Xiao & Olson, 2014; Insecure Local Storage: Shared Preferences, N.d.) 
As stealing data from the Shared preferences would require root level permissions 
on a malicious application or physical access to the device, developer can be sure 
that Shared Preferences is a relatively safe place to save user data, but should still 
keep in mind that it is not fool proof and user’s password still should not be saved 
there, see chapter 2.2 “Authentication and authorization to the backend” for more 
information about this topic. (Six, P. 2012, 21-22; Xiao & Olson, 2014; Insecure Local 
Storage: Shared Preferences, N.d; Storage Options, N.d) 
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2.3.2 Internal storage 
Android system offers the possibility to applications to save files directly in the de-
vice’s internal storage. These saved files are only accessible to the original applica-
tion via UID permissions and inaccessible to the user through file system. Upon unin-
stallation of the application, all files saved in the application’s internal storage will be 
deleted, so developer should make sure not to save any files belonging to the user 
there. (Storage Options, N.d.) 
As described in chapter 2.4.1 “Shared Preferences”, also internal storage files can be 
viewed by a malicious application with root level permissions or with physical access 
to the device by using ADB. (Insecure Local Storage, N.d.; Six, P. 2012, 21-22) 
Developer can also share application’s data saved in the Internal storage by using file 
modes, MODE_WORLD_WRITEABLE and MODE_WORLD_READABLE. According to 
Google (Security Tips, N.d.), this should not be used because they do not provide the 
ability to limit data access to particular applications, nor do they provide any control 
on data format. Instead, developers should be using Content Providers, which offer 
read and write permissions to other applications and can make dynamic permission 
grants on a case-by-case basis. 
2.3.3 External storage 
External storage is the removable media in the device, like SD cards, however, it can 
also be a partition in the built-in memory. All data written to the external storage is 
world readable, meaning that any application in the device can access them and user 
can view and edit saved data when user connects the device to a computer and ena-
bles USB mass storage to transfer files on a computer. This is because Linux permis-
sion based access control is not present in the External storage, as it is normally for-
matted using incompatible file system. (Storage Options, N.d; Six, P. 2012, 21-22) 
All data saved in the External storage is public, so the application should not save any 
confidential data there, nor should it trust any data read from the External storage, 
as any application could insert malicious data there. If application writes to the Exter-
nal storage and it is needs to be sure that no other application could read or modify 
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those files, then encryption and checksums should be used to verify data integrity. 
(Six, P. 2012, 21-22; Security Tips, N.d.) 
2.3.4 SQLite databases 
Android system offers applications possibility to create application specific SQLite 
databases to save repetitive or structured data. By default, created SQLite databases 
are only accessible to the application that created them because also SQLite 
databases are protected by the UID permissions. (Saving Data in SQL Databases. N.d; 
Six, P. 2012, 23.) 
Just like the Shared preferences and Internal storage files, also SQLite databases can 
be created with MODE_WORLD_WRITEABLE and MODE_WORLD_READABLE modes 
but as explained in chapter 2.4.2 “Internal storage”, this should be avoided and 
Content Providers should be used instead to share the data. (Six, P. 2012, 23; Security 
Tips, N.d.) 
SQLite database files are saved in the application’s data folder and are also 
extractable with the usage of the ADB and viewable to a malicous application with 
root level permissions. (Insecure Local Storage, N.d.; Six, P. 2012, 21-22) 
To avoid possible SQL injections, queries to the database should always be validated, 
and usage of the prepared statements is encouraged, especially if other applications 
are allowed to query the database thorugh a Content Provider. (Security Tips, N.d; 
Mobile Top 10 2014-M7, 2014) 
2.3.5 Application logging 
Android applications normally log application events using the Log class, and its 
output can be viewed with Logcat tool. Developers can use logging during the 
development phase of the application to debug it but might forget to disable it upon 
application release, or they might fail to understand why it should be disabled; or if 
logging is required, the developer could forget from limiting what is being logged. 
(Reading and Writing Logs. N.d.) 
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In 2014 Sanchez, (2014)  researched black box and static analysis to worldwide 
mobile home banking applications. Most of the log files from tested applications 
logged sensitive information, like user credentials. 
Prior Android version 4.1 Jelly Bean, Android API level 16, it was possible for any 
application with READ_LOGS permission to read logs of any application in the device. 
Even though this is now fixed, devices that will never get the needed update, or 
malicious applications with root level permissions could still read those logs. Also 
with physical access to the device, it is possible to extract and read all log files from 
the device using Eclipse IDE or ADB. (Exploiting Unintended Data Leakage (Side 
Channel Data Leakage), N.d.) 
2.4 IPC Security 
2.4.1 IPC endpoints 
Android’s inter-process communication, from now on IPC, is a mechanism that allows 
communication between Android services, Activities, Broadcast Receivers and Con-
tent Providers. Each Android component can be either public or private. If the com-
ponent is public, other components can interact with it. If it is private, the only com-
ponents that can interact with it are those that are part of the same app, e.g. ones 
that run with the same UID. (Six, 2012; Drake, Fora, Lanier, Mulliner, Ridley & 
Wicherski, 2014, 89; Security tips, N.d.) 
Consequences of improper security of the IPC endpoints vary depending on the type 
of the endpoint. For example, Content Providers could be vulnerable to data injec-
tion and data leakage and Activities could be vulnerable to the UI redressing attack. 
(Drake, J. 2014, 89) 
For example, André Moulu found vulnerable IPC endpoint in Samsung Kies software. 
Kies had “INSTALL_PACKAGES” permission and an unprotected Broadcast Receiver 
with registered action “KIES_START_RESTORE_APK”. Calling this with Intent would 
cause the broadcast receiver to start KiesService with the data from the Intent and 
the service then tries to install all APK packages from /sdcard/restore/ directory. He 
then proceeded to save his own application in that directory by exploiting another 
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application which had “WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE” permission and unprotected 
service that listened for an Intent “CLIPBOARD_SAVE_SERVICE”. Broadcasting that 
type of Intent allowed him to copy an APK package to the SD card. (Moulu, 2012; 
Drake, 2014, 90-91) 
2.4.2 Android permission system 
Accesses to the IPC components are restricted with the usage of Android permission 
system. Developer can create and implement custom permissions in developed com-
ponents, and the calling application must have these permissions in order for call to 
succeed. The application can check required permissions either programmatically or 
by declaring them in application’s manifest file. (Six, 2012; Permission, N.d.) 
There are four different levels of android permissions: 
1. Normal. Permissions that cannot do any real harm to the user. Such as changing 
wallpaper. Application must specifically request for these permissions but they are 
automatically granted. User can still view these permissions during application instal-
lation. (Permission. N.d.) 
 
2. Dangerous. Permissions that can cause real harm and loss of money to the user. 
Such as send SMS and open internet connections. Applications must request for 
these permissions and user must accept them. (Permission. N.d.) 
 
3. Signature. Custom permissions that are automatically granted for the requesting ap-
plication if it signed with the same certificate as the application that created the per-
mission. These are used to share data between related applications. (Permission. 
N.d.) 
 
4. Signature or System. Permissions that are granted only to applications that are in 
the Android system Image or that are signed with the s me certificate as the applica-
tion that created the permission. According to Android Developer site, these permis-
sions should be only used in special situations where multiple vendors have applica-
tions built into a system image and need to share specific features explicitly because 
they are being built together. (Permission. N.d.) 
 
 
 
Applications that use Signature-type permissions should not rely completely on the 
permission because Android system keeps track of installed permissions only by the 
name, so if a malicious application is installed with permission of same name as in a 
legitimate app, the legitimate application would use malicious permission that was 
declared by the malicious application. (Weichao, 2014.) 
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According to Weichao, (2014) from the Trend micro security, developers should not 
rely exclusively on the protection levels when their IPC endpoints are accessed. Sev-
eral functions, such as getCallingUid and getCallingPackage are provided by the oper-
ating system and can be used to identify any applications making the call and imple-
ment access control as needed. 
While installing the application, a list of required permissions is shown to the user 
who then either accepts them, or the application is not installed. From Android 6.0 or 
higher, and app's target SDK is 23 or higher, applications must specifically request 
dangerous permission while the application is running. Also from Android 6.0, API 
level 23, users can revoke permissions from any app at any time, even if the app tar-
gets a lower API level. In the name of reliability, the application should test if it still 
has permission for an action before executing it because user might have revoked 
the needed permission. (Requesting Permissions at Run Time, N.d.) 
2.4.3 Intents 
Intent is a messaging object that is used in IPC communication to request an action 
from another component. Intents are mainly used for three things, with Activities to 
show a screen, with Services to do a single operation, e.g. to execute a file download 
and to broadcast a message to other applications. (Intents and Intent Filters, N.d.) 
There are two types of Intents, Explicit and Implicit Intents. Explicit intents specify 
the component to start by name and are therefore often used to activate a compo-
nent in the same application. Implicit intents declare a general action to perform, 
which allows a component from another application to handle it. (Intents and Intent 
Filters, N.d.) 
In the figure below (Figure 5), when Implicit Intent is launched by Activity A (1), the 
Android systems finds matching Intent Filters from installed applications’ manifest 
files (2). If a match is found, the system starts that component and passes the Intent 
to it (3). If multiple components are found, then user is shown a dialogue to choose 
the used application. (Intents and Intent Filters, N.d.) 
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Figure 5. Implicit Intent flow. (Adapted from Intents and Intent Filters, N.d.) 
 
2.4.4 Intent Hijacking 
Because Implicit Intents are broadcast to the whole system, they are prone to be hi-
jacked. Access to Intents can be restricted with Android permissions and Intent Fil-
ters. If “Signature” or “SignatureOrSystem” permissions are not used to restrict ac-
cess to the launched Intent, then any application with matching Intent Filter could 
access it, and even worse if more accurate Intent Filter is used by the malicious appli-
cation, choosing dialog is not shown to the user. Even if choosing dialogue is shown 
to the user, user might accidentally choose a malicious application to be the default 
application for that type of Intents. (Security Tips, N.d.; Intents and Intent Filters, 
N.d.; Medianero, D. 2016) 
Malicious applications could “consume” the broadcast Intent in order to prevent le-
gitimate applications from getting it to execute denial-of-service attack, execute 
man-in-the-middle attack or to show malicious Activity for phishing user credentials. 
(Security Tips, N.d.; Intents and Intent Filters, N.d.; Medianero, D. 2016) 
According to Google, (Intents and Intent Filters, N.d.), Services should only be started 
with Explicit Intents and no Intent Filters should be declared for them. It cannot be 
known what service is started with an Implicit Intent and user cannot see which ser-
vice is started. From Android 5.0, API level 21, the system will throw an exception if a 
service is called with Implicit Intent. 
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As described in Chapter 2.5.2 Android permission system, a malicious application 
could still be installed, and granted permissions to the Intent. 
2.4.5 Intent Spoofing 
An installed malicious application could be broadcasting forged Implicit Intents to the 
Android system in order to cause legitimate applications to show Activities and start 
Services with malicious intentions; or simply to crash applications, causing denial-of-
service. Consequences of accepting forged Intents varies greatly between applica-
tions and are often very different, as shown in the example in Chapter 2.5.1. (Medi-
anero, 2016.) 
To protect an application from forged Intents, the developer should think if that In-
tent does indeed need to be implicit, or if possible, set custom “Signed” permission, 
and validate data from the Intent carefully. (Intent Spoofing Vulnerability in Android 
Apps – OWASP Top 10, 2015) 
2.4.6 Content Providers 
Content Providers are used to sharing private data between processes and applica-
tions in the Android system. Content provider also acts as an abstractor between its 
repository and the data. Just like other IPC endpoints, accesses to Content Providers 
are restricted using permissions. Content provider permissions have on top of normal 
permissions URI permissions that are used to limit access to the data in a specified 
URI. (Content Provider Basics. N.d.) 
For example if an image attachment is received in a mail application that is protected 
with permissions and a user wants to view the received image with an image viewer 
application, the image viewing application should not get full permissions to the mail 
application as it contains private data, therefore the image application should only 
receive URI permission to view that one image in the Content Provider. (Content 
Provider Basics, N.d.; System Permissions, N.d.) 
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Figure 6. Example of URI permissions. (Adapted from Six, J. 2012.) 
 
As seen in Figure 6, Application 2 has URI permission only to the /42 directory under 
the /attachments directory in Application 1 and therefore is only able to read the 
contents of that specific folder. If a Content Provider is for some reason made public, 
then it should not contain any sensitive data. (Six, 2012; Shòu, 2015) 
If access to a Content Provider is not limited, and untrusted user input is not sani-
tized before execution, the Content Provider could be vulnerable to SQL injection at-
tack. A malicious application could be inserting SQL queries that form a logical tautol-
ogy, causing Content Provider to return the whole content of a table. Therefore pa-
rameterized SQL should always be used instead of raw SQL. By parameterizing que-
ries developer does not only protect the Content Provider from SQL injection, but 
also increase its performance as the Content Provider does not need to parse every 
statement before execution. (Shòu, 2015; Makan, 2013) 
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3 Application management 
3.1 Android Application Packages 
It is not enough that an application is secure itself. Because of the nature of Android 
Application Packages, from now on APK, any code that is installed to an end-user’s 
mobile device can be reverse engineered back to debuggable source code. 
Therefore, the developer must be sure that code itself does not contain anything the 
developer wants to keep as a secret, such as passwords, keys and certificates. 
Additionally, the company should also try to avoid that no one who does not actually 
need the software can access its installation packages. (Fora, P., 2014) 
Because APKs can be easily reverse engineered back to the original source code, any 
application can be read, debugged and their operation understood. An attacker can 
use this to find new attack vectors to the software, create malicious version of the 
original application, or another company could create a copy for themselves to 
develop and sell, thus avoiding major development costs that the original developer 
had. 
3.2 Source code safety 
As mentioned before, code can be reverse engineered and easily modified. APK can 
be opened with very little effort with tools like APKtool. If any kind of obfuscation 
software were used when the package was built, all class and variable names are re-
versed back to original ones, making understanding of code much easier. 
No matter how well application data is encrypted, data will still appear unencrypted 
in the memory. A rooted device can read memory from the device that contains data 
and possibly even decryption keys.  
Attacker who runs an application in an emulator or uses a custom kernel can use 
tools such as Volatility and techniques such as loadable kernel modules to intercept 
data and keys used to encrypt the data. (Judge, N.d.) 
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3.2.1 Signing the package 
Android system prevents users from installing unsigned applications, so all APK pack-
age must be signed with the developer’s private key. Installation packages are signed 
using public-key cryptography, meaning that the original private key is impossible to 
extract from the signed package. 
The security of the developer’s private key is critical and it should never be kept in an 
unsecure or public place where several persons could access it. If the private key 
were to fall in the hands of an attacker, that person could sign and distribute apps 
that maliciously replace original apps or corrupt them. The attacker could also sign 
and distribute apps under developer’s identity that attack other apps, the system it-
self, corrupt or steal user data. (Signing Your Applications, N.d.) 
3.2.2 Obfuscation 
Event though security through obscurity is generally a bad idea if used alone, it can 
still be used to make cracking the code harder by making it more time consuming 
and frustrating. Obfuscation will not stop motivated and dedicated attacker, 
however, it may stop persons with little motivation, time or interest. (Avoid security 
by obscurity, N.d.) 
There are several tools to automatically obfuscate java code, and nowadays 
ProGuard tool is integrated in Android development studio, making obfuscating easy 
and fast. Tools will obfuscate code by removing unused code and renaming classes, 
fields, and methods with obscure names. See example of code obfuscated by 
ProGurad in Appedix 2. (ProGuard, N.d.) 
According to Simon Judge (Use the Android NDK for security Sensitive code, N.d.), 
the most vital parts of an application, such as tamper detection could be written in 
Android NDK. NDK is a tool set that allows implementation of native-code languages 
such as C and C++. When the application is compiled with maximum optimization, 
the parts that were written in native-language are much harder to decompile and 
understand. (Android NDK, N.d.) 
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3.2.3 Tamper detection 
By adding tampering detection to the application, the developer can try to prevent 
an attacker from making changes to the application’s code and stop it from 
debugging the application in a emulator, or at least make it unbearably hard. The 
idea is to read device variables, application data and other environment variables to 
determine if the code is run in debug mode, emulator or if it has been altered. 
Tamper detection should also be made in the server side code, so tamper detection 
code cannot be altered or removed so easily. (Alexander-Bown, N.d.) 
Issues to check include, however, are not limited to: 
1. Applications public key. 
2. Install source. 
3. Envrionment variables, eg. hardware. 
4. Manifest file’s debuggable field. 
5. Root status. 
 
By checking the public key, the developer can be sure that the application is the 
original one deployed, and by checking the install source from Android package 
manager it can be secured that it was installed from the original source. 
Checking the device’s environment variables and manifest file’s debuggable flag the 
application can try to determine if it is run in an actual device and not in a emulator.  
Of course, an attacker can try to find all tamper detection code, alter or remove  it 
and so fool both the application and server, however, when combined with methods 
mentioned in the previous chapter, it will be extremely hard and time consuming. 
3.3 Distribution of application and updates 
The application and its updates must be distributed to the customers. Because a 
company does not want the application to be public,  there is a need to choose the 
distribution and update channels and ensure their safety. 
The default appstore in an Android system is Google Play, and by default it is the only 
trusted source that is allowed to install applications straight away. Depending on the 
used device, it might have other pre-configured appstores, such as Amazon market 
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and Yandex; however, installing from any other source than Google Play, the user 
needs to accept installing applications from “Unknown Sources”, which could allow 
installing harmful applications without user’s consent. 
Customers have a huge impact on how applications should be deployed. If the 
customer company has a Mobilde Application Management Solution that allows 
distibuting applications and their updates, then of course that should be used, since 
using it is propably company policy and customer would not even allow any other 
way. 
3.3.1 Google Play 
Google play is the default app store in the Android system and the only trusted 
source allowed to install applications without “Unknown Sources”-setting on, which 
is a positive feature from the security point of view. 
Google play offers effortless distribution for applications and its updates with 
features that allow the creation of private distribution channels. Users can be added 
and removed from private channels and after adding users into one, users can 
dowload applications that are published there. (Developer Console Help, N.d.) 
While Google Play allows an easy distribution of applications to a private channel, 
there are no ways to uninstall applications from end-user’s device. After the user has 
been dropped out from the private channel, the installed application and its 
installation package cannot be uninstalled remotely. (Google Apps Administrator 
Help, N.d.) 
3.3.2 Mobile application management solutions 
While Google Play allows developers to restrict access to the application, customers 
might want to restrict its employees’ access to application stores in order to prevent 
them to accidentally install harmful or unproductive applications, or customers might 
not want to trust Google to keep their software, which is when Mobile Application 
Management (from now on MAM) tools step in. 
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MAM solutions can enable pushing applications and updates directly to the end-user 
or show an application in Google Play or in the company’s own app store where us-
ers can install apps for themselves. This way the application and updates are easy to 
distribute and there is no way that users might install a wrong, possibly malicious app 
from a store. (Steele, N.d.; Rouse, N.d.) 
Nevertheless, a customer company might not want to adopt MAM solutions for vari-
ous reasons, such as cost of the service, required work to keep it running and em-
ployee’s privacy concerns, if “Bring your own device”-policy has been applied. 
3.3.3 Other methods 
In some cases the customer company might not want to trust Google Play services 
and apply Mobile application management solution due the small scale of the 
project. Then the application and its updates must be distributed outside the app 
stores. 
After allowing installation from “Unknown sources”, users can install the application 
from anywhere, e.g. an email attachment or a company’s website. While this is 
obviosly the easiest way to distribute apps, it also has some serious issues. 
1. It is hard to keep track who has installed the application and it might be not easy to 
restrict access to installation file if it is distributed from a website.  
 
2. No steady source to install updates. Google play and some MAM solutions can push 
updates to end-user’s device, but when distributed from a website the users must 
check for update packages themselves or someone must email them.  
 
3. Allowing installing from “unknown sources”setting must be on. 
 
4. Effort to manually do all the things that other solutions would have already. 
 
5. No way to uninstall application from users that no longer need it. 
 
It is possible to create auto-update feature inside the application itself, where it 
would dowload the latest APKs from a server; however, this is undesirable because it 
would ask for an effort to create a code to securily dowload the updated APK and 
check automatically for updates, while all these services are already made in other 
solutions. (Strumpflohner, 2011.) 
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4 Conclusions 
Even as mobile applications are insecure in general, it seems that Android system 
itself is not insecure but rather developers are more focused on creating new 
features rather than improving applications’ security. Also, some degree of rushing 
and floppiness can be seen in security issues like unintended data leakage through 
application’s log files. 
Some categories, like Intents in IPC controls are something that most un-professional 
developers might not understand completely, and thus they cause security holes that 
way. Google has done a good job the in their recently released Android API versions 
to increase security in the Android system, for instance, by fixing that any application 
with READ_LOGS permissions could read any log of any application installed in to the 
device, or setting exported flag to false in IPC endpoints by default. These alone 
make the burden of the developer not only easier but also almost completely re-
move security issues regarding those issues. 
Finding optimal security solution is always about balancing between usability and se-
curity. If a client requests that they must be able to login to the application offline, 
this could compromise credentials of that specific user in case of losing the device to 
an adversary, yet, it could still be an important requirement in a map application. Or, 
writing excessive tamper detection would be quite redundant in a very small scale 
notepad application with not much functionality versus big scale banking application. 
Yet even the best security implementations in an application cannot save physical 
data in the device if the user is careless enough. For instance, on rooted device, if the 
user grants root permissions to a malicious application, then the malicious applica-
tion could access all resources in the device, or if an attacker gets physical access to 
the device and manages to bypass the device’s lock screen. But if an application is 
made secure, the attacker cannot gain anything by doing so, i.e. the attacker could 
only get user id and token but not password. Or, in a case with files, the attacker 
would only get encrypted files but not encryption keys if they are stored in the 
server.  
36 
 
 
This paper includes only the tip of the iceberg regarding secure mobile application 
development. Each and every topic contains so much more information and details 
that it would be possible to write a thesis of every chapter. Also, there was no way 
that it would have been possible to include every security aspect in this work, as 
every technology and process includes its own flaws. This work contains the most 
common pitfalls of mobile application development, however, that alone covers 
most of the security flaws in native Android applications.  
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